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ABSTRACT
We estimate an empirical model of consumption disasters using a new panel data set on personal consumer
expenditure for 24 countries and more than 100 years, and study its implications for asset prices. The
model allows for permanent and transitory effects of disasters that unfold over multiple years. It also
allows the timing of disasters to be correlated across countries. Our estimates imply that the average
disaster reaches its trough after 6 years, with a peak-to-trough drop in consumption of about 30%,
but that roughly half of this decline is reversed in a subsequent recovery. Uncertainty about consumption
growth increases dramatically during disasters. Our estimated model generates a sizable equity premium
from disaster risk, but one that is substantially smaller than in models in which disasters are permanent
and instantaneous. It yields new predictions for the dynamics of risk-free interest rates, the term structure
of interest rates, and the pricing of short-term versus long-term risky assets. The persistence of consumption
declines in our model implies that a large value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is necessary
to explain stock-market crashes at the onset of disasters.
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The average return on stocks is roughly 7% higher per year than the average return on bills across
a large cross-section of countries in the twentieth century (Barro and Ursua, 2008). Mehra and
Prescott (1985) argued that this large equity premium is dicult to explain in simple consumption-
based asset-pricing models. A large subsequent literature in nance and macroeconomics has sought
to explain this \equity-premium puzzle." In recent years, there has been growing interest in the
notion that the equity premium may be compensation for the risk of rare, but disastrous, events
such as wars, depressions, and nancial crises (Rietz, 1988; Barro, 2006).1
In Barro (2006), output is a random walk with drift, and rare disasters are identied as large,
instantaneous, and permanent drops in output. He calibrates the frequency and permanent impact
of disasters to match large peak-to-trough drops in real per-capita GDP in a long-term panel dataset
for 35 countries and shows that his model is able to match the observed equity premium with a
coecient of relative risk aversion of the representative consumer of roughly 4. More recently,
Barro and Ursua (2008) have gathered a long-term data set for personal consumer expenditure in
over 20 countries and shown that the same conclusions hold using these data. A growing literature
has adopted this model and calibration of permanent, instantaneous disasters (e.g., Wachter, 2008;
Gabaix, 2008; Farhi and Gabaix, 2008; Burnside, et al., 2008; Guo, 2007; and Gourio, 2010).2
An important critique of the Rietz-Barro disasters model calibrated to match the peak-to-trough
drops in output or consumption is that it may overstate the riskiness of consumption by failing
to incorporate recoveries after disasters (Gourio, 2008). A world in which disasters are followed
by periods of disproportionately high growth is potentially far less risky than one in which all
disasters are permanent. Kilian and Ohanian (2002) emphasize the importance of allowing for
large transitory uctuations associated with disasters such as the Great Depression and WWII in
empirical models of output dynamics. More generally, a large literature in macroeconomics has
debated whether it is appropriate to model output as trend or dierence-stationary (Cochrane,
1988; Cogley, 1990).
A second critique of the Rietz-Barro model is that it assumes that the entire drop in output
and consumption at the time of a disaster occurs instantaneously. In reality, most disasters unfold
1Piazzesi (2010) summarizes recent research on the equity premium, emphasizing four main explanations: habits
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), heterogeneous agents (Constantinides and Due, 1996), long run risk (Bansal and
Yaron, 2004) and rare disasters.
2Barro and Jin (2011) show that the required coecient of relative risk aversion can be reduced to around three
if the size distribution of macroeconomic disasters is gauged by an estimated power-law distribution.
1over multiple years. This prole implies that even though peak-to-trough declines in consumption
exceeding 30% have occurred in many countries, the annual decline in consumption in these episodes
is considerably smaller. Combining persistent declines in consumption into a single event might not
be an innocuous assumption. The assumption that the entire decline in output and consumption
associated with a disaster occurs in a single year is criticized in Constantinides (2008). Similarly,
Julliard and Ghosh (2010) argue that using annual consumption data as opposed to peak-to-trough
drops yields starkly dierent conclusions from Barro's original calibration.3
Given the growing importance of the disasters model in the macroeconomics, international
economics, and asset-pricing literature, a key question is whether it stands up to incorporating
a more realistic process for consumption dynamics during and following disasters. We develop
a model of consumption disasters that allows disasters to unfold over multiple years and to be
systematically followed by recoveries. The model also allows for transitory shocks to growth in
normal times and for a correlation in the timing of disasters across countries. This last feature of
the model allows us to capture the fact that major disasters|such as the world wars of the 20th
century|aect many countries simultaneously. Ours is the rst paper to estimate the dynamic
eects|both long term and short term|of these major disasters on consumption.
We estimate our model on annual consumption data from the newly constructed Barro and
Ursua (2008) dataset, using Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods.4 The model
generates endogenous estimates of the timing, magnitude, and length of disasters, as well as the
extent of recovery after disasters and the variance of shocks in disaster and non-disaster periods.
Our estimation procedure also allows us to investigate the statistical uncertainty associated with
the predictions of the rare-disasters model along the lines suggested by Geweke (2007) and Tsionas
(2005).5
3Julliard and Ghosh (2010) propose a novel approach to estimating the consumption Euler equation based on
generalized empirical likelihood methods, in the context of a representative agent consumption-based asset pricing
model with time-additive power utility preferences. A key dierence between our framework and theirs is that they
focus on power utility, as in the original Rietz-Barro framework. We show that allowing for a more general preference
specication is crucial in assessing the asset pricing implications of multi-period disasters and recoveries. Also, our
approach does not rely on the exact timing of asset price returns during disasters. As we discuss below, asset price
returns during disasters play a disproportionate role in determining the equity premium; yet these are also the periods
for which asset price data are most likely to be either missing or inaccurate, for example, because of price controls
during wars.
4We use a Metropolized Gibbs sampler. This procedure is a Gibbs sampler with a small number of Metropolis steps.
See Gelfand (2000) and Smith and Gelfand (1992) for particularly lucid short descriptions of Bayesian estimation
methods. See, e.g., Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) and Geweke (2005) for comprehensive treatment of
these methods.
5In particular, we analyze the extent to which the observed asset returns are consistent with the posterior dis-
tribution of the equity premium implied by our model, taking into account parameter uncertainty. Tsionas (2005)
discusses in detail the importance of accounting for nite-sample biases and parameter uncertainty in assessing the
2In estimating the model, we maintain the assumption that the frequency, size distribution, and
persistence of disasters is time invariant and the same for all countries. This strong assumption is
important in that it allows us to pool information about disasters over time and across countries.
The rare nature of disasters makes it dicult to estimate accurately a model of disasters with much
variation in structural characteristics over time and space.
We nd strong evidence for recoveries after disasters and for the notion that disasters unfold
over several years. We estimate that disasters last roughly six years on average. Over this period,
consumption drops on average by about 30% in the short run. However, about half of this drop
in consumption is subsequently reversed. The average long run eect of disasters on consumption
in our data is a drop of about 15%.6 We nd that uncertainty about future consumption growth
increases dramatically at the onset of a disaster. The standard deviation of consumption growth
in the disaster state is roughly 12% per year, several times its value during normal times. The
majority of the disasters we identify occur during World War I, the Great Depression, and World
War II. Other disasters include the collapse of the Chilean economy rst in the 1970's and again
in the early 1980's, and the contraction in South Korea during the Asian nancial crisis.
Our estimated model yields asset-pricing results that are intermediate between models that
ignore disaster risk and the more parsimonious disaster models considered in the previous literature.
We adopt the representative-agent endowment-economy approach to asset pricing|following Lucas
(1978) and Mehra and Prescott (1985)|and assume that agents have Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences.
Our model matches the observed equity premium with a coecient of relative risk aversion (CRRA)
of 6.4 and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of 2. For these parameter values, a model
without disasters yields an equity premium only one-tenth as large, while a model with one-period,
permanent disasters yields an equity premium 10 times larger. Given the close link between the
equity premium and the welfare costs of economic uctuations (Alvarez and Jermann, 2004; Barro,
2009), these dierences imply that our model yields costs of economic uctuations substantially
larger than a model that ignores disaster risk, but substantially smaller than the Rietz-Barro
disaster model.
The dierences between our model and the more parsimonious Rietz-Barro framework arise
both from the recoveries and the multi-period nature of disasters. Recoveries imply that disasters
ability of alternative models to t the observed equity premium, particularly in the presence of fat-tailed shocks.
6Cerra and Saxena (2008) estimate the dynamics of GDP after nancial crises, civil wars and political shocks
using data from 1960 to 2001 for 190 countries. They nd no recovery after nancial crises and political shocks but
partial recovery after civil wars. Their sample does not include WWI, the Great Depression and WWII. Davis and
Weinstein (2002) document a large degree of recovery at the city level after large shocks.
3have a much less persistent eect on dividends, reducing the drop in stock prices when disasters
occur. This modication, in turn, lowers the equity premium. The multi-period nature of disasters
aects the equity premium in a more subtle way. To generate a high equity premium, the marginal
utility of consumption must be high when the price of stocks drops. In our model, the price of
stocks crashes at the onset of disasters|with the initial news that a disaster is underway|while
consumption typically reaches its trough several years later. This lack of coincidence between
the stock-market crash and the trough of consumption reduces the equity premium in our model
relative to the Rietz-Barro model. In addition, since households anticipate persistent consumption
declines at the onset of a disaster|they expect things to get worse before they get better|they
have a strong motive to save that does not arise in the Rietz-Barro model. This desire to save limits
the magnitude of the stock-market decline during disasters, further reducing the equity premium.
On the other hand, if agents have EZW preferences with CRRA > 1 and IES > 1, reductions in
expected future consumption growth and increases in uncertainty about future consumption raise
marginal utility for a given value of current consumption.
A key feature of our model is the predictability of consumption growth during disasters|
consumption typically declines for several year before recovering. These features imply that the
IES, which governs consumers' willingness to trade-o consumption over time, plays an important
role in determining the asset-pricing implications of our framework. There is considerable debate
in the macroeconomics and nance literature about the value of the IES. Several authors|notably
Hall (1988)|argue that the IES is close to zero. However, others|such as Bansal and Yaron (2004)
and Gruber (2006)|argue for substantially higher values of the IES.
The large movements in expected consumption growth associated with disasters provide a strong
test of consumers' willingness to substitute consumption over time. For a low value of the IES,
our model implies a surge in stock prices at the onset of disasters and a negative equity premium
in normal times. The reason is that entering the disaster state generates a strong desire to save,
because consumption is expected to fall further in the short run. When the IES is substantially
below one, this savings eect dominates the negative eect that the disaster has on expected
future dividends from stocks and, therefore, raises the price of stocks.7 These predictions do not
accord with the available evidence. Disasters are typically associated with stock-market crashes.
This observation supports the view that consumers have a relatively high willingness to substitute
7Gourio (2008) makes this point forcefully in a simpler setting. For similar reasons, an IES larger than one plays
an important role in the long run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004).
4consumption over time (at least during disasters), motivating a high value of the IES.
Our estimated model yields additional predictions for the behavior of short-term and long-term
interest rates. One potential concern is that the same factors driving a high equity premium would
also generate a high term premium|a prediction that is not supported by the empirical evidence
(Campbell, 2003; Barro and Ursua, 2008). We show that this is not the case. Our model implies
a positive equity premium but a negative term premium for risk-free long-term (real) bonds that
arises from the hedging properties of long-term bonds during disaster periods. Our model also
generates new predictions for the dynamics of risk-free interest rates surrounding disasters. In
particular, the strong desire to save during disasters drives down the return on short-term bonds,
leading to low real interest rates during disaster episodes, as observed in the data.
We consider an extension of our model that allows for partial default on bonds. Empirically,
ination risk is an important source of partial default on government bonds. Data on stock and
bond returns over disaster periods indicate that short-term bonds provide substantial insurance
against disaster risk in only about 70% of cases. When we allow for an empirically realistic degree
of default on short-term bonds, a risk aversion parameter of 7.5 is needed to t the observed equity
premium. Because ination unfolds sluggishly in the data, the eects of ination risk on short-
term bonds is less severe than on long-term bonds. Incorporating this fact allows us to match the
upward-sloping term premium for nominal bonds.
We employ the Mehra and Prescott (1985) methodology for assessing the asset-pricing implica-
tions of our model. Hansen and Singleton (1982) pioneered an alternative methodology based on
measuring the empirical correlation between asset returns and the stochastic discount factor. An
important diculty with employing the Hansen-Singleton approach is that the observed timing of
real returns on stocks and bonds relative to drops in consumption during disasters is aected by
gaps in the data on asset prices as well as price controls, asset price controls and market closure.
For example, stock price data are missing for Mexico in 1915-1918, Austria in WWII, Belgium in
WWI and WWII, Portugal in 1974-1977, and Spain in 1936-1940. The Nazi regime in Germany
imposed price controls in 1936 and asset-price controls in 1943 that lapsed only in 1948. In France,
the stock market closed in 1940-1941 and price controls aected measured real returns over a longer
period. Given these data limitations, Barro and Ursua (2009) take the approach of computing the
covariance between the peak-to-trough decline in asset prices and a consumption based stochas-
tic discount factor using a \exible timing" assumption regarding the intervals over which these
declines occur. Under this assumption, it is possible to match the equity premium for moderate
5values of risk aversion. Their calculations highlight the disproportionate importance of disasters in
matching the equity premium. Non-disaster periods contribute trivially to the equity premium.8
A number of recent papers study whether the presence of rare disasters may also help to explain
other anomalous features of asset returns, such as the predictability and volatility of stock returns.
These papers include Farhi and Gabaix (2008), Gabaix (2008), Gourio (2008), and Wachter (2008).
Martin (2008) presents a tractable framework for asset-pricing in models of rare disasters. Gourio
(2010) embeds disaster risk in a business-cycle model and shows that time-varying disaster risk can
generate joint dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices that are consistent with the
data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the Barro-Ursua data on long-term personal
consumer expenditure. Section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4 discusses our estimation
strategy. Section 5 presents our empirical estimates. Section 6 studies the asset-pricing implications
of our model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
In estimating our disaster model, it is crucial to use long time series whose starting and ending
points are not endogenous to the disasters themselves. It is also crucial that the data set contain
information on the evolution of macroeconomic variables during disasters; Maddison's (2003) ten-
dency to interpolate GDP data during wars and other crises is not satisfactory for our purposes.
Furthermore, to analyze the asset-pricing implications of rare disasters, it is important to measure
consumption dynamics, as opposed to output dynamics.
We use a recently created data set on long-term personal consumer expenditures constructed
by Robert Barro and Jose Ursua and described in detail in Barro and Ursua (2008).9 This data set
includes a country only if uninterrupted annual data are available back at least before World War
I, yielding a sample of 17 OECD countries and 7 non-OECD countries.10 To avoid sample-selection
8Another concern regarding the Hansen-Singleton methodology|emphasized by Geweke (2007) and Arakelian and
Tsionas (2009)|is that parsimonious asset pricing models are suciently stylized that formal statistical rejections
may not be very informative.
9These data are available from Robert Barro's website, at:
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data sets barro.
10The OECD countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal , Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S. The \non-OECD" countries are Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, and Taiwan. See Barro and Ursua (2008) for a detailed description
of the available data and the countries dropped due to missing data. In cases where there is a change in borders, as
in the case of the unication of East and West Germany, Barro and Ursua (2008) smoothly paste together the initial
per capita series for one country with that for the unied country.
6bias problems associated with the starting dates of the series, we include only data after 1890.
The resulting data set is an unbalanced panel of annual data for 24 countries, with data from each
country starting between 1890 and 1914, yielding a total of 2685 observations.
One limitation of the Barro-Ursua consumption data set is that it does not allow us to distinguish
between expenditures on non-durables and services versus durables. Unfortunately, separate data
on durable and non-durable consumption are not available for most of the countries and time periods
we study. For time periods when such data are available, however, the eect of excluding durables
on the overall decline in consumer spending during disasters is small. The proportionate decline
in spending on non durables and services is on average only 3 percentage points smaller than the
overall decline in consumer spending (Barro and Ursua, 2008). The reason is that for most of the
time period we study, durables accounted for only a small fraction of consumer expenditures. The
eect of excluding durables is even smaller during the largest disasters, because durable consumer
expenditures can at most fall to zero. The remaining fall in consumer expenditures must come
entirely from non-durable expenditures.
In analyzing the asset-pricing implications of our model, we make use of total returns data on
stocks, bills, and bonds from Global Financial Data (GFD), augmented with data from Dimson,
Marsh, and Staunton (2002) and other sources. These data are described in detail in Barro and Ur-
sua (2009). Unfortunately, these data are less comprehensive than the corresponding consumption
series and often contain gaps for disaster periods. Price controls and controls on asset prices also
make the exact timing of real returns dicult to measure during disasters. We therefore use these
data to assess the predictions of our model primarily by considering average returns in non-disaster
periods and cumulative returns over disaster periods.
3 An Empirical Model of Consumption Disasters
We model log consumption as the sum of three unobserved components:
ci;t = xi;t + zi;t + i;t; (1)
where ci;t denotes log consumption in country i at time t, xi;t denotes \potential" consumption
in country i at time t, zi;t denotes the \disaster gap" of country i at time t|i.e., the amount by
which consumption diers from potential due to current and past disasters|and i;t denotes an
i.i.d. normal shock to log consumption with a country specic variance 2
;i;t that potentially varies
with time.
7The occurrence of disasters in each country is governed by a Markov process Ii;t. Let Ii;t = 0
denote \normal times" and Ii;t = 1 denote times of disaster. The probability that a country that is
not in the midst of a disaster will enter the disaster state is made up of two components: a world
component and an idiosyncratic component. Let IW;t be an i.i.d. indicator variable that takes the
value IW;t = 1 with probability pW. We will refer to periods in which IW;t = 1 as periods in which
\world disasters" begin. The probability that a country not in a disaster in period t 1 will enter the
disaster state in period t is given by pCbWIW;t +pCbI(1 IW;t), where pCbW is the probability that
a particular country will enter a disaster when a world disaster begins and pCbI is the probability
that a particular country will enter a disaster \on its own." Allowing for correlation in the timing
of disasters through IW;t is important for accurately assessing the statistical uncertainty associated
with the probability of entering the disaster state. Once a country is in a disaster, the probability
that it will exit the disaster state each period is pCe.
We model disasters as aecting consumption in two ways. First, disasters cause a large short-
run drop in consumption. Second, disasters may aect the level of potential consumption to which
the level of actual consumption will return. We model these two eects separately. First, let i;t
denote a one-o permanent shift in the level of potential consumption due to a disaster in country
i at time t. Second, let i;t denote a shock that causes a temporary drop in consumption due to the
disaster in country i at time t. For simplicity, we assume that i;t does not aect actual consumption
on impact, while i;t does not aect consumption in the long run. In this case, i;t may represent
a permanent loss of time spent on R&D and other activities that increase potential consumption
or a change in institutions that the disaster induces. The short run shock, i;t, could represent
destruction of structures, crowding out of consumption by government spending and temporary
weakness of the nancial system during the disaster.
We assume that i;t is distributed i;t  N(;2
). This implies that we do not rule out the
possibility that disasters can have positive long-run eects. Crises can, e.g., lead to structural
change that benets the country in the long run. We consider two distributional assumptions
for the short-run shock i;t. Both of these distributions are one sided reecting our interest in
modeling disasters. In our baseline case, i;t has a truncated normal distribution on the interval
[ 1;0]. We denote this as i;t  tN(;2
 ; 1;0), where  and 2
 denote the mean and
variance, respectively, of the underlying normal distribution (before truncation). We use  and 2

to denote the mean and variance of the truncated distribution. We also estimate a model with
 i;t  Gamma(;). The gamma distribution is a exible one-sided distribution that has
8excess kurtosis relative to the normal distribution.
Potential consumption evolves according to
xi;t = i;t + i;t + Ii;ti;t; (2)
where  denotes a rst dierence, i;t is a country specic average growth rate of trend consumption
that may vary over time, i;t is an i.i.d. normal shock to the growth rate of trend consumption with
a country specic variance 2
;i. This process for potential consumption is similar to the process
assumed by Barro (2006) for actual consumption. Notice that consumption in our model is trend
stationary if the variances of i;t and i;t are zero.
The disaster gap follows an AR(1) process:
zi;t = zzi;t 1   Ii;ti;t + Ii;ti;t + i;t; (3)
where 0  z < 1 denotes the rst order autoregressive coecient and i;t is an i.i.d. normal
shock with a country specic variance 2
;i. We introduce i;t mainly to aid the convergence of our
numerical algorithm.11 Since i;t is assumed to aect potential consumption but to leave actual
consumption unaected on impact, it gets subtracted from the disaster gap when the disaster
occurs.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the type of disaster our model can generate. For simplicity,
we abstract from trend growth and set all shocks other than i;t and i;t to zero. The Figure depicts
a disaster that lasts six periods and in which z = 0:6 and i;t =  0:125 and i;t =  0:0025 in each
period of the disaster. Cumulatively, log consumption drops by roughly 0.40 from peak to trough.
Consumption then recovers substantially. In the long run, log consumption is 0.15 lower than it
was before the disaster. This disaster is therefore partially permanent. The negative i;t shocks
during the disaster permanently lower potential consumption. The fact that the shocks to i;t are
more negative than the shocks to i;t mean that consumption falls below potential consumption
during the disaster. The dierence between potential consumption and actual consumption is the
disaster gap in our model. In the long run, the disaster gap closes|i.e., consumption recovers|so
that only the drop in potential consumption has a long run eect on consumption. Our model
can generate a wide range of paths for consumption during a disaster. If i;t = 0 throughout the
11MCMC algorithms have trouble converging when the objects one is estimating are highly correlated. In our case,
zt and zt+j for small j are highly correlated when there are no disturbances in the disaster gap equation between
time t and time t + j. This would be the case in the \no disaster" periods in our model if it did not include the
i;t shock. In fact, zt and zt+j would be perfectly correlated in this case. It is in order to avoid this extremely high
correlation that we introduce small disturbances to the disaster gap equation.
9disaster, the entire disaster is transitory. If on the other hand i;t = i;t throughout the disaster,
the entire disaster is permanent.
A striking feature of the consumption data is the dramatic drop in volatility in many countries
following WWII. Part of this drop in consumption volatility likely reects changes in the procedures
for constructing national accounts that were implemented at this time (Romer, 1986; Balke and
Gordon, 1989). We allow for this break by assuming that 2
;i;t takes two values for each country:
one before 1946 and one after. Allowing for this feature is important in not overestimating the
occurrence of disasters in the early part of the sample. Another striking feature is that many
countries experienced very rapid growth for roughly 25 years after WWII. We allow for this by
assuming that i;t takes three values for each country: one before 1946, one for the period 1946-
1972 and one for the period since 1973.12 We discuss the implications of allowing for such trend
breaks in section 5.
One can show that the model is formally identied except for a few special cases in which
multiple shocks have zero variance. Nevertheless, the main challenge in estimating the model is the
relatively small number of disaster episodes observed in the data. We, therefore, assume that all the
disaster parameters|pW, pCbW, pCbI, pCe, z, , 2
, , 2
|are common across countries and time
periods. This assumption allows us to pool information about the disasters that have occurred in




;i|to vary across countries.
4 Estimation
The model presented in section 3 decomposes consumption into three unobserved components:
potential consumption, the disaster gap and a transitory shock. One way of viewing the model is,
thus, as a disaster lter. Just as business-cycle lters isolate movements in output attributable to
the business cycle, our model isolates movements in consumption attributable to disasters. Despite
the large number of unobserved states and parameters, it is possible to estimate our model eciently
using Bayesian MCMC methods.13
12See Perron (1989) and Kilian and Ohanian (2002) for a discussion of trend breaks in macroeconomic aggregates.
13Bayesian MCMC methods have recently been applied to many problems in nance in which it is necessary to
estimate a large number of unobserved states (see e.g., Pesaran et. al, 2006; and Koop and Potter, 2007). An impor-
tant technical reason that Bayesian MCMC methods work well in our setting is that many of the unobserved states
can be sampled using a Gibbs sampler as opposed to more computationally costly methods. Our algorithm samples
from the posterior distributions of the parameters and states using a Gibbs sampler augmented with Metropolis steps
when needed. This algorithm is described in greater detail in appendix A. The estimates discussed in section 5 for
10To carry out our Bayesian estimation we need to specify a set of priors on the parameters of
the model. The full set of priors we use is:
  N(0;0:2);   U(0:01;0:25);
  U( 0:25;0); 
  U(0:01;0:25);
  U( 0:25;0);   U(0:01;0:25);
pW  U(0;0:1); pCbI  U(0;0:02);
pCbW  U(0;1); 1   pCe  U(0;0:9);
z  U(0;0:9);
i;t  N(0:02;1); ;i;t  U(0;0:15);
;i  U(0;0:15); ;i  U(0;0:015):
We consider two specications for the short run shock i;t|a truncated normal distribution and
a gamma distribution. Thus, we specify two sets of priors for this shock. For the case of i;t
shocks that have a truncated normal distribution, we specify priors on  and 
|the mean and
standard deviation of the normal distribution before it is truncated. For the alternative case with
gamma distributed i;t shocks, we place priors on the mean and standard deviation of i;t|which
we denote  and . These priors imply a joint prior distribution over  and .
A key parameter in our model is |the mean long-run eect of the disaster shock, which
determines the extent of recovery from a disaster. Our prior for this parameter is symmetric and
highly dispersed. Thus, the prior is agnostic about whether disasters have any long run eect at
all|and allows for the possibility that in some cases the long-run eect of a disaster might actually
be positive, as could arise if the disaster led to a favorable change in institutions. Our estimated
long run eect of disasters thus comes entirely from the data.
Our priors on the probability of disasters embed the assumption that disasters are in fact rare.
On the one hand, we do not wish to \overestimate" the probability of disasters by choosing a prior
on disasters that places a large prior weight on high disaster frequencies. On the other hand we
do not wish to choose a prior that constrains the posterior distribution of disasters from above. In
fact, our results are relatively insensitive to allowing for more dispersed priors on the probability
both versions of the model, are based on four independent Markov chains each with 2 million draws with the rst
150,000 draws from each chain dropped as burn-in. The four chains are started from 2 dierent starting values, 2
chains from each starting value. We choose these two sets of starting values to be far apart in a sense made precise
in the appendix. We use a number of techniques to assess convergence. First, we employ Gelman and Rubin's (1992)
approach to monitoring convergence based on parallel chains with \over-dispersed starting points" (see also Gelman,
et al. 2004, ch 11). Second, we calculate the \eective" sample size (corrected for autocorrelation) for the parameters
of the model. Finally, we visually evaluate \trace" plots from our simulated Markov chains.
11of disasters, since the probability of disasters is essentially pinned down by the frequency of large
and unusual events (wars, depressions, and nancial crises).
Importantly, our priors in no way downweight the possibility that there are no rare disasters
in the data generating process, or that the disasters are in fact small. Thus, our results on the
importance of disasters are in no sense \built in" to our priors. We further verify this in section 6
by re-estimating the model using articial data generated from a model without disasters. We show
that if the model were truly generated by a process without disasters, our model would deliver a
tight posterior around zero on the importance of disasters for asset prices|in stark contrast to our
results based on estimating the model using actual data.
We limit the scope of disasters by setting an upper bound on the half-life of the disaster gap. This
restriction rules out the possibility that consumption growth in a given period can be explained by
disasters that occurred decades earlier.14 We also place upper bounds on the frequency of disasters.
Our results are not sensitive to this assumption. Finally, recall that i;t is introduced mainly to
aid numerical convergence of our MCMC sampling algorithm. We therefore restrict its magnitude
such that it has a negligible eect on the predictions of the model.
We have extensively investigated the robustness of our asset pricing results to alternative spec-
ications of the priors. For example, priors that restrict disasters to occur less frequently yield
similar results because these specications still allow for the infrequent occurrence of very large
disasters, which contribute most to the equity premium.
5 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents our estimates of the disaster parameters for our baseline case. For each parameter,
we present the parametric form of the prior distribution, the mean of the prior and its standard
deviation, as well as the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation. We refer to the posterior
mean of each parameter as our point estimate for that parameter.
The principle new features of our model relative to the Rietz-Barro model of permanent, instan-
taneous disasters are 1) the possibility of recoveries after disasters, and 2) the notion that disasters
may unfold over several years. We nd strong empirical support for both of these features. We can
gauge the extent to which our results imply that disasters are followed by recoveries by comparing
our estimate of |the mean of the short-run shock i;t|and |the mean of the long-run shock i;t.
14This approach is analogous to one used in the asset-pricing literature of placing restrictions on jumps in returns
and volatility (Eraker, Johannes and Polson, 2003).
12We estimate  =  0:111, while we estimate  =  0:025. This implies that the short-term negative
shock to consumption during disasters is on average 11.1% per year, while the long-run negative
impact of the disaster on consumption is only 2.5% per year. In other words, most disasters are
followed by substantial recoveries.
Our estimate of pCe|the probability that a country exits a disaster once one has begun|
provides strong support for the notion that disasters unfold over several years. According to our
estimates, a country that is already in a disaster will continue to be in the disaster in the following
year with a 0.835 probability. This estimate implies that the average length of disasters is roughly
6 years, while the median length of disasters is 4 years.
To get a better sense for what these parameters imply about the nature of consumption disasters,
Figure 2 plots the impulse response of a \typical disaster." This prototype lasts for 6 years, and
the sizes of the short-run and long-run eects are set equal to the respective posterior means of
these parameters for each of the six disaster years (i.e. i;t =  and i;t = ). The gure shows that
the maximum short run eect of this typical disaster is approximately a 27% fall in consumption
(a 0.32 fall in log consumption), while the long-run negative eect of the disaster is approximately
14%.15
Our estimates of  and |the standard deviation of the short-run shock i;t and long-run
shock i;t|are 0.083 and 0.121, respectively. The large estimated values of these standard deviations
reveals that there is a huge amount of uncertainty during disasters about the short-run as well as
the long-run eect of a disaster on consumption. Figure 3 illustrates this. Consider an agent at
time 0 who knows that a disaster will begin at time 1 but knows nothing about the character of
this disaster beyond the unconditional distribution. The solid line in Figure 3 plots the mean of
the distribution of beliefs of such an agent about the change in log consumption going forward
relative to what his beliefs were before he received the news about the start of a disaster.16 The
dashed lines in the gure plot the median, 5%, and 95% quantiles of this same distribution. Figure
3 therefore gives an ex ante view of disasters, while Figure 2 gives an ex post view of a particular
disaster.
Figure 3 illustrates the huge risk associated with disasters. When a disaster strikes, there is a
non-trivial probability that consumption will be more than 50% lower than without the disaster
15The maximum drop is \only" roughly twice the size of the long-run drop even though the average size of the
short-run shocks is more than four times larger than the average size of the long-run shock. This is because the eect
of the short-run shocks in the rst few years of the disaster have largely died out by the end of the disaster.
16In other words, the solid line in Figure 3 plots E[ci;t+zjIi;t = 1;t 1] - E[ci;t+zjIi;t = 0;t 1] for z = 0;1;2:::
and where t 1 denotes the information set known to agents at time t   1.
13even 20-25 years later. This long left tail of the disaster distribution is particularly important for
asset pricing. The median long-run eect is smaller than the mean long-run eect because the
distribution of disaster sizes is negatively skewed. At rst glance, Figure 3 seems to suggest more
permanence in disasters than the typical disaster graph in Figure 2. This pattern arises because
the average short-run eect depicted in Figure 3 averages over many disasters of varying lengths
and is, therefore, muted relative to the individual disasters, which reach their troughs at dierent
points in time.17
Figure 4 provides more detail about how our model interprets the evolution of consumption
for France, Korea, Chile, and the United States.18 The two lines in each panel plot consumption
and our estimate of potential consumption. The bars give our posterior probability estimate that
a country was in a disaster in each year. For France, the model picks up WWI and WWII as
disasters. The model views WWII as largely a transitory event for French consumption. The
permanent eect of WWII on French consumption is estimated to be only about 7%. The French
experience in WWII is typical for many European countries. For South Korea, our model interprets
the entire period from 1940 to 1960 as a single long disaster that spans WWII and the Korean War.
In contrast to the experience of many European countries, our estimates suggest that the crisis in
the 1940's and 1950's had a large permanent eect on South Korean consumption (48%). This
pattern is typical of the experience of Asian countries in our sample during WWII.
While the bulk of the disasters we identify are associated with world disasters, we also identify
a number of idiosyncratic disaster events. Some of these idiosyncratic disasters are associated with
nancial or debt crises. For example, we identify a disaster in South Korea at the time of the Asian
Financial Crisis and in Argentina at the time of their 2002 sovereign default.19 Other idiosyncratic
disasters are associated with regional wars, coups, or revolutions. These include Chile's experience
during the 1970's.
The last panel in Figure 4 plots results for the United States. Relative to most other countries in
17For example, a short disaster may reach its trough after 2 years while a long disaster may reach its trough after
10 years. The average drop in consumption at a given point in time (relative to the start of the disaster) is an average
over some disaster paths for which consumption is already recovering after having reached its trough at an earlier
point and other disaster paths for which consumption is still falling toward a later trough. The trough in average
consumption is, therefore, far less severe than the average of the troughs across dierent disasters. In contrast, the
long-run average level of consumption is equal to the average of the long-run levels of consumption across the dierent
disaster paths. It is the fact that the trough in average consumption is so much less than the average of the troughs
that makes the average disaster path look more permanent than in the case of the prototype disaster.
18More detailed gures for all the countries in our study are reported in a web appendix.
19Countries such as Indonesia and Thailand likely also experienced disasters during the Asian Financial Crisis but
are not in the data set.
14our sample, the United States was a tranquil place during our sample period. The model identies
two disaster episodes for the United States. The rst disaster begins in 1914 and lasts until 1922,
encompassing both WWI and the Great Inuenza Epidemic of 1918-1920. The Great Depression
is identied as a second disaster for U.S. consumption. The Great Depression is the larger of the
two disasters with a 26% short-run drop in consumption and a 14% long-run drop.
One could also ask whether the relative tranquility of the U.S. experience since the Great
Depression provides evidence that the United States is fundamentally dierent from other countries
in our sample. However, the posterior probability for a randomly selected country experiencing no
disasters over a 72-year stretch is 0.12 according to our model. The posterior probability of at
least one out of 24 countries experiencing no disaster over a 73-year stretch is 0.60. Therefore,
the tranquility of the U.S. experience (which is not randomly selected) does not provide evidence
against our model.
Figure 5 plots our estimates of the probability that a \world disaster" began in each year.20 Our
model clearly identies World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II as world disasters.
Our estimate of pW|the probability that a world disaster begins|is 3.7% per year. Countries
are estimated to have a 62.3% probability of entering disasters conditional on a world disaster,
but a much lower (0.6% per year) probability of entering a disaster \on their own." The overall
probability that a country enters a disaster is 2.8% per year.21
Our Bayesian estimation procedure does not deliver a denitive judgment on whether a disaster
occurred at certain times and places but rather provides a posterior probability of whether a disaster
occurred. For expositional purposes, however, it is useful to dene \disaster episodes" as periods
when the posterior probability of a disaster is estimated to be particularly high. We dene a
disaster episode as a set of consecutive years for a particular country such that: 1) The probability
of a disaster in each of these years is larger than 10%, and 2) The sum of the probability of disaster
for each year over the whole set of years is larger than one.22 In a few cases, our model is not able
20This is the posterior mean of IW;t for each year. In other words, with the hindsight of all the data up until 2006,
what is our estimate of whether a world disaster began in say 1940?
21The overall probability that a country will enter a disaster is pWpCbW +(1 pW)pCbI. Since the three parameters
involved are not independent, we cannot simply multiply together the posterior mean estimates we have for them to
get a posterior mean of the overall probability of entering a disaster. Instead, we use the joint posterior distribution
of these three parameters to calculate a posterior mean estimate of the overall probability that a country enters a
disaster.
22More formally: A disaster episode is a set of consecutive years for a particular country, Ti, such that for all t 2 Ti
P(Ii;t = 1) > 0:1 and
P
t2Tt P(Ii;t = 1) > 1. The idea behind this denition is that there is a substantial posterior
probability of a disaster for a particular set of consecutive years. We stress that the concept of a disaster episode
is purely a descriptive device and does not inuence our analysis of asset pricing. One could consider broader or
narrower denitions (lower or higher cutos) of disaster episodes. In our experience, there are few borderline cases.
15to distinguish between two or more episodes of economic turmoil that occur in the same country
over a short span of time and therefore lumps these events into one long disaster episode.23
Using this denition, we identify 53 disaster episodes. Summary statistics for the main disaster
episodes are reported in Table 2, including the short-run and long-run eects of the disaster. In all
cases, these statistics measure the negative eect of the disaster on the level of consumption relative
to the counter-factual scenario where the country instead experienced normal trend growth. On
average, the maximum drop in consumption due to the disasters is 29%, while the permanent eect
of disasters on consumption is on average 14%, consistent with our estimates of the permanent and
transitory components of disaster shocks.
The goal of our empirical model is to capture the dynamics of consumption during major
disasters. To assess how well the model performs on this dimension, Figure 6 compares the path of
consumption after the onset of disasters in the model and in the data. For the data, we consider
the 49 disaster episodes that are not left censored in our data|i.e., begin after the rst year of data
we have for that country. For these disaster episodes we consider the evolution of consumption for
10 years after the onset of the disaster episode relative to its level in the year before the disaster
episode began and calculate the median across episodes for each year. For the model, we simulate
1000 disasters, consider analogous paths for consumption and calculate the median as well as the
25th and 75th quantiles of the distribution of outcomes for consumption across these disasters.
The path of consumption after the onset of a disaster in the model turns out to match its data
counterpart quite well. At all horizons, the median for the data is well within the inter-quartile
range for the model.
Tables 3 and 4 present the remaining parameter estimates for our empirical model. Table
3 presents country-specic estimates of the mean growth rate of potential consumption for the
countries in our sample. In most cases, the growth rate of potential consumption is estimated to
have risen in 1946 and fallen in 1973, consistent with the large literature on the post-WWII \growth
miracle" and the \productivity slowdown." The structural features of the economy generating such
breaks are not incorporated into our model, since investors assume that any changes in long-run
growth rates they may have observed in the past will not repeat themselves in the future. An
interesting question is whether there is a systematic tendency of such breaks to be positive or
negative following disaster episodes. Such a pattern does not appear to be present in the data.
While WWII was followed by a 30 year period of high growth in many countries, this pattern did
23Examples include WWII and the Korean war for South Korea and WWI and the Great Depression for Chile.
16not apply following WWI or the Great Depression. Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson (2012)
analyze movements in long-run growth rates around disaster periods.24
Table 4 presents country-specic estimates of the variances of the permanent and transitory
shocks to consumption. We nd a great deal of evidence for a break in the variance of the transitory
shock in 1946. For all but ve of the countries in our data set, our estimates of the variance of the
transitory shocks to consumption fell dramatically from the earlier period to the later period. Romer
(1986) argues that in the case of the United States this volatility reduction is due to improvements
in measurement.
For robustness, we have estimated an alternative specication of our model in which we assume
that i;t|the short-run disaster shock|has a Gamma distribution. Most of the estimates are
similar to the baseline case. The main dierence is that the gamma model assigns a somewhat
larger portion of the volatility of consumption during disasters to the short-run shock as opposed
to the long-run shock.
6 Asset Pricing
We follow Mehra and Prescott (1985) in analyzing the asset-pricing implications of the consump-
tion process we estimate in section 5 within the context of a representative consumer endowment
economy. We assume that the representative consumer in our model has preferences of the type
developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). For this preference specication, Epstein and














where Rj;i;t+1 denotes the gross return on an arbitrary asset j in country i from period t to period
t+1, and Rw;i;t+1 denotes the gross return on wealth of the representative agent in country i, which
in our model equals the endowment stream. The parameter  represents the subjective discount
factor of the representative consumer. The parameter  =
1 
1 1= , where  is the coecient of
relative risk aversion (CRRA), and   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), which
governs the agent's desire to smooth consumption over time.25
24Bansal and Yaron's (2004) long-run risk model suggests that persistent movements in the average growth rate of
consumption and time variation in economic uncertainty could raise the equity premium implied by our model.
25The representative-consumer approach that we adopt abstracts from heterogeneity across consumers. Wilson
(1968) and Constantinides (1982) show that a heterogeneous-consumer economy is isomorphic to a representative-
17The asset-pricing implications of our model with Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW) preferences cannot
be derived analytically. We therefore use standard numerical methods.26 We begin by calculating
returns for two assets: a one period risk-free bill and an unleveraged claim on the consumption
process. In section 6.3, we calculate asset prices for a long-term bond and allow for partial default
on bills and bonds during disasters.
Our asset pricing data includes rates of return for stocks, bonds and bills for 17 countries over
long periods. The average arithmetic real rate of return on stocks is 8.1% per year, while the average
arithmetic real rate of return on short term bills is 0.9% per year. The average equity premium is
therefore 7.2% per year. If we view stock returns as a levered claim on the consumption stream,
the target equity premium for an unleveraged claim on the consumption stream is lower than that
for stocks. According to the Federal Reserve's Flow-of-Funds Accounts for recent years, the debt-
equity ratio for U.S. non-nancial corporations is roughly one-half. This amount of leverage implies
that the target equity premium for an unleveraged consumption claim in our model should be 4.8%
per year (7.2/1.5).27 We therefore take 4.8% per year as the target for the equity premium in our
analysis.
To analyze the asset-pricing implications of our model we must choose values for the CRRA,
, the IES,  , and the discount factor, . There is little agreement within the macroeconomics
and nance literature about the appropriate value for the IES. Hall (1988) estimates the IES to
be close to zero. This estimate is obtained by analyzing the response of aggregate consumption
growth to movements in the real interest rate over time. Yet, as noted by Bansal and Yaron
(2004) and Gruber (2006), the interest rate and consumption growth result from capital-market
equilibrium, making it dicult to estimate the causal eect of one on the other without strong
consumer economy if markets are complete and agents have expected utility preferences. See also Rubinstein (1974).
Constantinides and Due (1996) argue that highly persistent, heteroscedastic, uninsurable income shocks can resolve
the equity-premium puzzle.
26We solve the integral in equation (4) on a grid. Specically, we start by solving for the price-dividend ratio for







denotes the price dividend ratio of the consumption claim. We specify a grid for PDR
C
t over the state space. We
then solve numerically for a xed point for PDR
C
t as a function of the state of the economy on the grid. We can then
rewrite equation (4) for other assets as PDRt = Et[f(Ct+1;Dt+1;PDR
C
t+1;PDRt+1)], where PDRt denotes the
price dividend ratio of the asset in question and Dt+1 denotes the growth rate of its dividend. Given that we have
already solved for PDR
C
t , we can solve numerically for a xed point for PDRt for any other asset as a function of
the state of the economy on the grid. This approach is similar to the one used by Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
and Wachter (2008).
27Dividing the equity premium for levered equity by one plus the debt-equity ratio to get a target for unleveraged
equity is exact in the simple disaster model of Barro (2006). A concern with this approach in our case is that rms
may have an incentive to default during disasters. We abstract from this issue. Abel (1999) argues for approximating
levered equity by a scaled consumption claim. Bansal and Yaron (2004) and others have adopted this approach. For
our model, the two approaches yield virtually indistinguishable results.
18structural assumptions. These concerns are sometimes addressed by using lagged interest rates as
instruments for movements in the current interest rate. However, this instrumentation strategy is
successful only if there are no slowly moving parameters of preferences and technology (including
especially parameters related to uncertainty) that aect interest rates and consumption growth.
Alternative procedures for identifying exogenous variation in the interest rate sometimes generate
much larger estimates of the IES. For example, Gruber (2006) uses instruments based on cross-
state variation in tax rates on capital income to estimate a value close to 2 for the IES. As a
consequence, a wide variety of parameter values for the IES are used in the asset-pricing literature.
On the one hand, Campbell (2003) and Guvenen (2008) advocate values for the IES well below
one, while Bansal and Yaron (2004) use a value of the IES of 1.5 and Barro (2009) relies on Gruber
(2006) to use a value of 2. We argue below that low values of the IES are starkly inconsistent
with the observed behavior of asset prices during consumption disasters. We therefore focus on
parameterizations with an IES equal to two|  = 2|as our baseline case.
We present results for several dierent values of the CRRA. Our baseline value of the CRRA
is chosen to match the equity premium in the data. Dierences in the discount factor  have only
minimal eects on the equity premium in our model.28 They do, however, aect the risk-free rate.
We choose the discount factor  to match the risk-free rate in the data for our baseline values for
 and  . This procedure yields a value of  = exp( 0:034).
The consumption data we analyze reect any international risk sharing that agents may have
engaged in. The asset-pricing equations we use are standard Euler equations involving domestic
consumption and domestic asset returns. In principle, we could also investigate the asset-pricing
implications of Euler equations that link domestic consumption, foreign consumption, and the
exchange rate (see, e.g., Backus and Smith, 1993). A large literature in international nance
explores how the form that these Euler equations take depends on the structure of international
nancial markets. Analyzing these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. However, recent work
suggests that rare disasters may help to explain anomalies in the behavior of the real exchange
rate.29
28In the continuous time limit of our discrete time model, the equity premium is unaected by .
29Papers on this topic include Bates (1996), Brunnermeier et al. (2008), Burnside et al. (2008), Farhi et al. (2009),
Farhi and Gabaix (2008), Guo (2007) and Jurek (2008).
196.1 The Equity Premium with Epstein-Zin-Weil Preferences
Table 6 presents our main results regarding the equity premium. The equity premium is reported for
three cases: our baseline model as estimated in section 5, a version of our model without disasters
as in Mehra and Prescott (1985), and a version of the model in which disasters are permanent and
occur in a single period as in Barro (2006).30 The statistics we report are the logarithm of the
arithmetic average gross return on each asset (log E[Rj;i;t+1]). These calculations are based on the
posterior means of the parameters of our model.31 We discuss sampling uncertainty below.
Our estimated model matches the observed equity premium given a CRRA of 6.4. For this
CRRA, the model yields an equity premium about ten times larger than the model without dis-
asters. The model without disaster risk implies essentially no equity premium, in line with Mehra
and Prescott (1985). Our analysis shows, therefore, that even accounting for the partially tran-
sitory nature of disasters, and the fact that they unfold over multiple years, disaster risk greatly
amplies the equity premium. On the other hand, the model with permanent, one-period disasters
of the type analyzed in Barro (2006) yields an equity premium roughly 10 times larger than our
estimated model. Our analysis, thus, also shows that ignoring recoveries and the multi-year nature
of disasters greatly overstates their asset-pricing implications. Given the close link between the
equity premium and the welfare costs of economic uctuations (Alvarez and Jermann, 2004; Barro,
2009), these dierences imply that our model yields costs of economic uctuations substantially
larger than a model that ignores disaster risk but substantially smaller than the Rietz-Barro model
of permanent and instantaneous disasters.
Figure 7 depicts equity and bond returns over the course of a \typical" disaster when IES = 2
and  = 6:4. When the news arrives that a disaster has struck, the stock market crashes. In
contrast, the return on risk-free bills is not aected in this initial period. This crash in the value of
stocks relative to bonds at the onset of the disaster coincides with a sizable drop in consumption.
The fact that stocks payo poorly at the onset of disasters, when consumption is low and the
marginal utility of consumption is high, implies that stocks must yield a considerable return-
premium over bills in normal times. In other words, the equity premium in normal times in our
model is compensation for the risk of a disaster occurring.
30For the model without disasters, we set the probability of entering a disaster to zero. For the model with
permanent, one-period disasters, we set the probability of exiting a disaster equal to one, assume that i;t = i;t, and
that the distribution of these shocks corresponds to the distribution of the peak-to-trough drop in consumption over
the course of disasters in our baseline model.
31For the parameters 
2
;i;t and i;t we use the values for the post-1946 and post-1973 periods, respectively. And
we assume that agents view these parameters as being xed.
20The consumption decline in any given year of a disaster is substantially smaller than the peak-
to-trough declines used to calibrate simpler disaster models|we estimate the short-run eect of
the disaster on consumption to be about 10% on average. In Barro (2006), disasters of a magnitude
of 10% have essentially no eect on the equity premium. How, then, do our estimates generate a
sizable disaster premium? The key point is that the current short-run decline in consumption is
paired with news about future declines in consumption and a large increase in uncertainty about
future consumption|eects that do not arise in simpler disaster models. The dramatic decline
in expected future consumption growth and increase in uncertainty at the onset of the disaster
contribute to the magnitude of the stock-market decline and to the premium households are willing
to pay for assets that insure against disaster events.
Table 7 presents more detailed results and results for additional parameterizations. For each
specication, we present results on the one hand for a long sample with a representative set of
disasters and on the other hand for a long sample for which agents expect disasters to occur with
their normal frequency but no disasters actually occur. This latter case is meant to capture asset
returns in \normal" times, such as the post-WWII period (at least up to 2006) in most OECD
countries.
To assess the importance of allowing for recoveries after disasters, specication 2 presents asset-
pricing results for the case in which disasters are completely permanent (but unfold over several
years).32 With permanent disasters and a CRRA of 6.4, the equity premium doubles to 10%. A
world in which disasters are completely permanent is clearly much riskier than a world in which
there is substantial recovery after disasters. This specication of the model matches the equity
premium in the data when the CRRA is set to 4.4.33 The fact that our model allows for partial
recovery after disasters thus accounts for a large part of the dierence in our results and the results
of Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008).
To assess the role of the multi-period nature of disasters in our model, specication 3 presents
results for a case in which the drop in consumption associated with a disaster occurs in a single
period and the drop is permanent. With a CRRA of 6.4, this model yields an equity premium
of 47%. We can match the equity premium in the data for this specication of the model with
32We consider a version of our model in which i;t = i;t and set the mean and variance of these shocks for each
year of the disaster equal to the mean and variance of peak-to-trough drops in consumption due to disasters in our
baseline model divided by the expected length of disasters.
33Notice that we lowered the CRRA by roughly 30% and this change leads to a drop in the equity premium of about
50%. This pattern illustrates that the equity premium is highly convex in the CRRA in our model. Specications 5
and 6 of Table 7 illustrate this point further.
21a CRRA of 3.0.34 This specication raises the equity premium because the stock market crash
coincides perfectly with the trough in consumption|when the marginal utility of consumption is
highest. In contrast, when disasters unfold over multiple periods, the stock market crash occurs at
the onset of the disaster, while a large fraction of the drop in consumption occurs in subsequent
periods. Also, if the drop in consumption associated with a disaster occurs in a single period,
it does not lead to an increased desire to save. In multi-period disasters, expectations of further
drops in consumption increase the desire to save. This response strengthens the demand for stocks,
limiting the magnitude of the stock-market crash.
To assess the importance of the short-run drop in consumption during disasters, specication 4
presents results for a case in which the short-run disaster shocks are set to zero. In this specication,
the occurrence of a disaster does not bring with it a sharp drop in consumption followed by a partial
recovery. Rather, consumption falls gradually due to the long-run disaster shocks while the disaster
persists. With a CRRA of 6.4, this specication yields an equity premium of 3.0%|about 60%
of the equity premium in the benchmark specication. This shows that both the short-run and
long-run eects of disasters on consumption are important for the equity premium.
An advantage of our formal estimation approach is that it allows us to investigate the strength
of the statistical evidence for disaster risk as an explanation for the equity premium. Because they
occur rarely, there is much less information on the frequency, size, and shape of disasters than on
business-cycle phenomena. This perspective suggests that the statistical uncertainty regarding the
estimates of the equity premium presented above may be large. The posterior distribution for the
equity premium implied by the posterior distribution of the parameters of our model is plotted in
Figure 8 for our baseline parameter values. Figure 8 shows that our estimates place more than
90% weight on parameter combinations that generate an equity premium of more than 3.3%. The
centered 90% probability interval for the equity premium implied by the model is [3:0%; 7:0%].
A dierent way of assessing this issue is to plot the posterior distribution of the value of the
CRRA that matches the observed equity premium. This distribution is plotted in Figure 9.35 The
centered 90% probability interval for the CRRA is [5:3;7:8]. Thus, despite the limited data, the
34The model analyzed in specication 3 is very similar to the model analyzed by Barro and Ursua (2008). Their
model matches the equity premium when  = 3:5, while the model in specication 3 matches the equity premium
for  = 3:0. This dierence arises because the size distribution of disasters in our model is relative to trend, while
the peak-to-trough distribution used by Barro and Ursua (2008) does not adjust for trend growth over the course
of the disaster and because of dierences between our approach to estimating the distribution of disasters and the
non-parametric approach used by Barro and Ursua (2008).
35For every parameter combination sampled from the estimated posterior distributions of the parameters, we
calculate the value of the CRRA required to match the equity premium.
22observed disasters provide substantial statistical evidence that it is possible to explain the observed
equity premium with values of the CRRA less than 10.
To check that our results are not somehow \built in" to our priors or estimation algorithm,
we analyze what our estimation algorithm implies for a data set generated from a model without
disasters; that is, a setting similar to the one used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). In this counter-
factual exercise, it is important that we allow ourselves only as many observations as we have in
the data. We therefore simulate an articial dataset of the same size as our data (24 countries and
a total of 2685 observations) from our model with the disaster probabilities set to zero. We then
estimate our model on these data and calculate the posterior distribution of the equity premium.
This distribution is plotted in Figure 10. For this alternative data set, our model places a large
probability on the equity premium being below 1%. These results are strikingly dierent from
those implied by our estimated model (Figure 8), indicating that it is the data|not our priors or
estimation algorithm|that lead us to the conclusion that the fear of rare disasters can explain a
sizable equity premium.
It is interesting to note in Figure 10 that while the majority of the mass is located close to
zero, the distribution has a long right tail. This distribution implies that even if no disasters were
observed in a sample the size of ours, agents might still place some weight on the notion that
disasters occur with a non-trivial probability and that the sample they had observed was simply
not representative of the underlying process (a \Peso problem").
For robustness, we also calculated asset-pricing results for the alternative specication of our
model in which the short-run disaster shocks follow a Gamma distribution. This case yields similar
asset pricing results, which are presented in specication 7 of Table 7. With  = 6:4 and an IES
of 2, the equity premium is 3.2% and the risk-free rate is 2.2%. The gamma model matches the
equity premium and risk-free rate when  = 7:7. This dierence arises because the gamma model
allocates slightly more of the overall volatility in consumption to the short-run shock than to the
long-run shock, compared to the baseline model.
6.2 The Equity Premium with Power Utility
Much work on asset pricing|including Mehra and Prescott (1985), Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006)|
considers the special case of power utility. In this case, the coecient of relative risk aversion
equals the reciprocal of the IES| = 1= . In other words, a single parameter governs consumers'
willingness to bear risk and substitute consumption over time. Asset pricing results for our model
23with power utility are presented in specications 8-10 of Table 7. With  = 1=  = 4|the utility
specication used by Barro (2006)|our model yields starkly dierent results from those with an
IES of 2. The most striking dierence is that the equity premium in normal times is negative,
i.e., lower than in a model in which no disasters can occur. Since the overall equity premium is
positive, this model implies that high returns during disasters make up for low returns in normal
times. This outcome contrasts with Barro (2006), in which the equity premium arises in normal
times, and stocks do poorly during disasters.
Why does our model with power utility yield such dierent results from earlier work by Barro
(2006)? The key dierence is that the multi-period disasters in our model yield large movements in
expected consumption growth. Figure 11 presents a time-series plot of the behavior of equity and
bond returns over the course of a \typical" disaster for our baseline multi-period disaster model with
power utility. Notice that there is a huge positive return on equity at the start of the disaster (when
the news arrives that a disaster has struck). The reason is that entering the disaster state causes
agents in the model to expect further drops in consumption going forward. Given the low value of
the IES in this model (1/4) this generates a tremendous desire to save to smooth consumption that
is large enough to drive up stock prices, despite the bad news about future dividends associated
with the disaster. This pattern implies that agents need not be compensated for holding stocks in
normal times to oset disaster risk|in fact, equity is a hedge against disaster risk and, therefore,
commands a negative premium in normal times. During disasters, stockholders demand an equity
premium as compensation for the risk associated with the stock-market crash that occurs at the
end of the disaster. Needless to say, the prediction that stocks yield hugely positive returns at the
onset of disasters is highly counterfactual. We take this as strong evidence against low values of
the IES at least during times of disaster.36
These counterintuitive asset-pricing results arise because, in our estimated model, disasters
unfold over multiple periods, leading to strong movements in expected consumption growth. Figure
12 presents a plot analogous to Figure 11 for the case of a single-period permanent disaster when
agents have power utility. In this case, there is no change in expected consumption growth going
forward, since the disaster is over as soon as it begins. As a consequence, there is no increased
desire to save pushing up stock prices. Equity, thus, fares extremely poorly relative to bonds at
36Similarly counter-intuitive results for the case of IES < 1 have been emphasized by Bansal and Yaron (2004) and
Barro (2009). Bansal and Yaron (2004) observe that with an IES < 1 a fall in the growth rate of consumption or a
rise in uncertainty leads to a rise in the price-dividend ratio of stocks. Barro (2009) shows that with an IES < 1 a
rise in the probability of disasters also leads to a rise in the price-dividend ratio of stocks.
24times of disasters, and this behavior generates a large equity premium in normal times.
Another counterintuitive feature of the power utility case|emphasized by Gourio (2008)|is
that one-period permanent disasters yield a lower equity premium than one-period disasters that
are followed by partial recoveries|see specications 9 and 10 in Table 7.37 The reason for this
dierence is that, when agents expect a partial recovery after a disaster, they would like to borrow
when the disaster strikes to smooth consumption. This force depresses stock prices and thus raises
the equity premium. With an IES substantially below one, this force is strong enough that it
outweighs the fact that the news about future dividends is not as bad in the case of partially
permanent disasters as in the case of fully permanent disasters.
6.3 Long-Term Bonds, Ination Risk, and Partial Default
The predictable movements in consumption surrounding disasters yield equilibrium movements in
real interest rates that do not arise in simpler disaster models. During disasters, consumers expect
consumption to keep falling and thus have an incentive to save. This force drives up the price-
dividend ratio for assets and drives down their expected returns. As a consequence, stock and bill
returns are lower on average during disasters than in normal times, even after the initial crash (see
Figure 7). Furthermore, the return on assets is temporarily high during the recovery period after
a disaster.
These features of asset prices in our model line up well with the data. Barro (2006) reports
low returns on bills and stocks during many disasters. He also presents evidence that real returns
on U.S. Treasury bills were unusually low during wars. This regularity is inconsistent with many
macroeconomic models (Barro, 1997, Ch. 12). There is, furthermore, some evidence that real
returns on bills are temporarily high after wars; for example, in the United States after the Civil
War and WWI. These features are absent in random-walk models of disasters, in which expected
consumption growth is constant.
The variation in expected consumption growth during disasters also implies a non-trivial term
structure of real interest rates. Our data contain information on real returns on long-term bonds
for 15 countries over a long sample period. The underlying claims are nominal government bonds
usually of around ten-year maturity. The average arithmetic real rate of return on these bonds is
37In specication 10, the probability of exiting a disaster equals one, implying that disasters last only one period.
The distribution of i;t is equal to the distribution of the peak-to-trough drop in consumption over the course of
disasters in our baseline model. Finally, the distribution of i;t is equal to the distribution of the long-run eect of a
disaster on consumption in our baseline model.
252.7% per year. The real return on bills for the same sample is 1.5% per year. Thus, the average
real term premium in these data is 1.2% per year.
To approximate long-term bonds in our model, we consider a perpetuity with coupon payments
that decline over time. We denote the gross annual growth rate of the coupon payments by Gp.
We report results for Gp = 0:9, a value that implies a duration for our perpetuity close to that of
10-year coupon bonds.38
We begin by considering real bonds with no risk of default. The returns on such long-term
bonds in our baseline model are reported in the rst column of Table 8. The average return on
such bonds is -2.1% per year. This result implies a term premium of -3.2% per year. In contrast,
the term premium in a version of our model without disasters is virtually zero. The reason the
long-term bonds have such low average returns in the presence of disasters is that they are an
excellent hedge against disaster risk.
To understand why the long bond is a valuable hedge against disasters, it is useful to compare
it to stocks. When a disaster occurs, stocks are aected in two ways. First, the disaster is a
negative shock to future expected dividends. This eect tends to depress stock prices. Second, the
representative consumer has an increased desire to save, which tends to raise stock prices. With
an IES=2, the rst eect dominates the second one, and stocks decline in value at the beginning
of a disaster. The dierence between a long-term bond and stocks is that the coupon payments on
the bonds are not aected by the disaster. The only eect that the disaster has on the long-term
bond is therefore to raise its price because of consumers' increased desire to save. Since the price of
long-term bonds rises at the onset of a disaster, these bonds provide a hedge against disaster risk
and earn a lower rate of return than bills in normal times.
A potentially important feature of the data that we have so far left out of our model is the
possibility of partial default on nominal bonds. While literal default on bills is rare, even during
disasters, ination may lead to partial default on bills, particularly during disasters. To calibrate the
probability of partial default, we follow Barro and Ursua (2009) in considering peak-to-trough drops
in stock prices over time periods that correspond roughly to consumption disasters. Extending their
empirical asset-price calculations to bills, we nd that in 74% of the largest consumption disasters|
25 cases out of 34|stock returns are lower than bill returns.39 The average stock return in these
38The duration of 10-year bonds with yields to maturity and coupon rates between 5% and 10% ranges from 6.5
years to 8 years. Our perpetuity has a duration of 7 years when its yield is 5%.
39Here we identify disasters as events in which the peak-to-trough drop in consumption is larger than 17%. We
choose this cuto because applying it to the data yields a set of events that corresponds closely to the disaster episodes
identied by our model. For the subset of countries that we use to estimate our model, we get 48 events as compared
2625 cases is -34%, while the average bill return is -3%. In the remaining 9 cases, the real return on
stocks and bonds are similar. In these cases, the low real returns on bills (and bonds) are caused
by huge amounts of ination. These cases also tend to be ones in which the measurement of the
timing of returns is most suspect because of market closure and controls on goods and asset prices.
These calculations suggest that an appropriate calibration of the probability of partial default
is 26% (9/34). To be conservative, we set the probability of partial default to 40%, as in Barro
(2006). The second and third columns of Table 8 report results for calibrations that allow for
partial default on bills. For a CRRA of 6.4, this modication lowers the equity premium from 4.8%
to 3.3%. Raising the CRRA to 7.5 restores the equity premium to 4.8%.
The news that a disaster has struck may aect the returns on long-term bonds more than the
returns on bills if it raises inationary expectations without leading to an immediate jump in the
price level. This is one possible reason for the positive term premium on long-term nominal bonds
in the data. We can match this term premium by raising the probability of partial default on
long-term bonds relative to short-term bonds. The fourth column in Table 8 reports results for a
case in which the probability of partial default on the perpetuity is 84%, while the probability of
partial default on short-term bonds is 40%. For these probabilities of partial default, our model
matches the term premium on nominal bonds in the data.
Our model implies that, without default risk on bonds, the term structure is downward sloping;
but introducing partial default can match the observed upward-sloping term structure for nominal
bonds. If most of the default risk comes from ination risk, our model implies that the term
structure for real bonds should be less upward sloping or even downward sloping. In the United
Kingdom, a large and liquid market for indexed government bonds has existed for several decades.
Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) document that while the U.K. nominal yield curve has been upward
sloping, the real yield curve has been downward sloping. In the United States, indexed bonds
(TIPS) have been trading since 1997. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) document that the TIPS curve
over this period appears to be mostly upward sloping, contrary to our prediction. They caution,
however, that this evidence is hard to assess because of the short sample and poor liquidity in the
TIPS market.40
to 53 disaster episodes identied by our model. The average drop in consumption for these events is 32%, compared
to 29% for our disaster episodes. There are 34 events for which we have data on both stock and bill returns.
40See also Evans (1998), Barr and Campbell (1997) and Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009).
276.4 Additional Predictions
Recent work by van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2010) and Binsbergen et al. (2010) has shown
that short term dividend strips on the aggregate stock market have substantially higher expected
returns than the stock market as a whole.41 They point out that this fact is dicult to match
using leading equilibrium asset-pricing models, such as Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and
Yaron (2004), and Barro (2006). In contrast, this feature arises naturally in our model. For the
baseline calibration of our model, a one-year dividend strip on unleveraged equity|i.e., an asset
that pays o a single dividend equal to consumption in the next period|has a return premium of
13.7% over bills outside of disasters, compared to an unleveraged equity premium of 4.9% for the
stock market as a whole. This pattern reects the presence of recoveries in our model, which raise
the riskiness of short-term assets relative to long-term assets.42
Our model is related, in general terms, to other explanations for the equity premium in which
predictable movements in consumption play an important role. A leading example is the long-run
risks model of Bansal and Yaron (2004). However, one important dierence between our model and
theirs is that, while consumption growth is highly predictable during disasters and in the periods
immediately following disasters, we do not require that it be predictable in other periods. Since
disasters occur infrequently, the explanatory power of the price-dividend ratio in predicting future
consumption growth at medium and short horizons is close to zero in our model.43 In contrast, the
long-run risks model generates substantial forecastability of consumption growth using the price-
dividend ratio. Beeler and Campbell (2009) argue that this feature of the model is hard to reconcile
with U.S. consumption data, particularly in the post-WWII period.
The analysis of this section suggests that variation in expected consumption growth surrounding
disasters has important implications for asset pricing. It is nevertheless useful to ask what param-
eters would best approximate our estimated consumption process in the simpler random walk
framework studied by Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006). The equity premium in the random-walk
41The price of a k-year dividend strip is the present value of the dividend paid in k years.
42Lettau and Wachter (2007) present a model in which long-horizon assets are less risky than short-horizon assets.
A key feature of their model|like ours|is that negative shocks to dividends are associated with increases in expected
dividend growth. Lettau and Wachter posit an exogenous stochastic discount factor that generates important asset
pricing implications of these shocks for the cross-section of expected returns and use asset-price data to calibrate its
parameters. In our model, the stochastic discount factor is derived from the utility function of the representative
consumer and the dynamics of consumption. Our model therefore provides evidence of an important role for these
shocks based on consumption data alone.
43Specically, we have analyzed regressions of consumption growth at 1, 3 and 5-year horizons on the current price
dividend ratios. The R
2 of such regressions is consistently 3% or less.
28model is,
logERe   logRf = 2 + pEfb[(1   b)    1]g;
where p denotes the probability of disasters, b denotes the permanent instantaneous fraction by
which consumption drops at the time of disasters, 2 denotes the variance of consumption growth
in normal times, and  denotes the coecient of relative risk aversion. Fixing the probability of
disasters at our empirical estimate of 2:8%, we can replicate our baseline equity premium results
in the random-walk model with a xed disaster size of b = 0:27.44 This value of b is substantially
smaller than in the parameterizations implied by Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008) where
the risk-adjusted disaster size is roughly 0.4.45 The smaller \eective" size of disasters implied by
our estimates arises from the importance of recoveries and multi-period disasters.
7 Conclusion
We estimate a quantitative model of consumption disasters that allows for recoveries, and for
disasters to unfold over multiple periods. We nd strong evidence for both of these features.
Allowing for recoveries implies less risk associated with disasters, lowering the equity premium for
given risk aversion. Allowing disasters to unfold over multiple periods implies strongly predictable
movements in consumption, which also leads to a reduction in the equity premium. Even accounting
for these features of the data, and for the statistical uncertainty arising from the rare nature of
disasters, disaster risk greatly amplies the equity premium.
Our estimated model matches the observed equity premium given a coecient of relative risk
aversion (CRRA) of 6.4, with a centered 90% probability interval of [5:3;7:8]. For these parameters,
a Mehra-Prescott type model that ignores disaster risk implies an equity premium close to zero. On
the other hand, the Rietz-Barro model yields an equity premium more than 10 times as large as our
benchmark model. These conclusions are robust to the inclusion of empirically realistic amounts
of default risk on government bonds.
The predictable movements in consumption growth we estimate surrounding disasters imply
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution plays a more important role than in simpler disaster
44Specically, this is the value of b that matches the observed equity premium for our baseline estimate of risk
aversion of  = 6:4 and disaster probability p = 2:8%.
45Both Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008) study models with a distribution of disaster sizes. However, it is
possible to solve for the value of b that matches their equity premium results for a given value of p and . Barro and
Ursua (2008) analyze a model with a disaster probability of 0:0363 and  = 3:5, implying that the equity premium
results can be replicated with b = 0:4. Barro's (2006) calibration assumes a disaster probability of 0:017 and  = 4,
implying that b = 0:36 is required to t the equity premium.
29models. At the onset of a disaster, agents expect steep future declines in consumption, implying
a strong desire to save. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low, stock prices will
counterfactually boom at the onset of disasters. This counterfactual prediction provides evidence
against low values of the IES at least during times of disaster. The predictable movements in
consumption we estimate also yield equilibrium movements in interest rates, a non-trivial term
structure of interest rates, and predictions for dividend strips on stocks that line up well with
recent empirical estimates.
A concern for tractability has required us to make a number of simplifying assumptions when
specifying our empirical model. For example, we assume that the short-run and long-run disaster
shocks are uncorrelated. In reality, these may be positively correlated. We also abstract from any
correlation in the size of contemporaneous disasters across countries and our specication for the
correlation in the timing of disasters is very simple (e.g. abstracts from geographic variation and
autocorrelation). Also, we do not incorporate time variation in growth and uncertainty during
normal times. Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson (2012) estimate a model that incorporates these
last two features and nd that they have important asset pricing implications. As computational
costs continue to fall, we hope that future research will be able to relax more of these assumptions.
An interesting extension of our approach would be to estimate a model of time-variation in
disaster probabilities and trend growth rates. Aside from variation in the actual probability of
disasters, the perceived disaster probability may vary due to learning. Even conditioning on all
the available time-series data, our estimates suggest there is substantial uncertainty regarding
the disaster parameter, implying that learning may play an important role. Variation in disaster
probabilities and expected future growth rates, whether real or perceived, have the potential to
generate signicant volatility of asset returns|an important feature of the asset pricing data.
30A Model Estimation
We employ a Bayesian MCMC algorithm to estimate our model. More specically, we employ
a Metropolized Gibbs sampling algorithm to sample from the joint posterior distribution of the
unknown parameters and variables conditional on the data. This algorithm takes the following
form in the case of our model.
The full probability model we employ may be denoted by
f(Y;X;) = f(Y;Xj)f();
where Y 2 fCi;tg is the set of observable variables for which we have data,
X 2 fxi;t;zi;t;IW;t;Ii;t;i;t;i;tg







is the set of parameters. From a Bayesian perspective, there is no real importance to the distinction
between X and . The only important distinction is between variables that are observed and
those that are not. The function f(Y;Xj) is often referred to as the likelihood function of the
model, while f() is often referred to as the prior distribution. Both f(Y;Xj) and f() are
fully specied in sections 3 and 4 of the paper. The likelihood function may be constructed by
combining equations (1)-(3), the distributional assumptions for the shocks in these equations and
the distributional assumptions made about Ii;t and IW;t in section 3. The prior distribution is
described in detail in section 4.
The object of interest in our study is the distribution f(X;jY ), i.e., the joint distribution of
the unobservables conditional on the observed values of the observables. For expositional simplicity,
let  = (X;). Using this notation, the object of interest is f(jY ). The Gibbs sampler algorithm
produces a sample from the joint distribution by breaking the vector of unknown variables into
subsets and sampling each subvector sequentially conditional on the value of all the other unknown
variables (see, e.g., Gelman et al., 2004, and Geweke, 2005). In our case we implement the Gibbs
sampler as follows.
1. We derive the conditional distribution of each element of  conditional on all the other
elements and conditional on the observables. For the ith element of , we can denote this
conditional distribution as f(ij i;Y ), where i denotes the ith element of  and  i
31denotes all but the ith element of . In most cases, f(ij i;Y ) are common distributions
such as normal distributions or gamma distributions for which samples can be drawn in a
computationally ecient manner. For example, the distribution of potential consumption for
a particular country in a particular year, xi;t, conditional on all other variables is normal.
This makes using the Gibbs sampler particularly ecient in our application. Only in the case





) are the conditional distributions not readily recognizable.
In these cases, we use the Metropolis algorithm to sample values of f(ij i;Y ).46
2. We propose initial values for all the unknown variables . Let 0 denote these initial values.
3. We cycle through  sampling t
i from the distribution f(ijt 1







and d denotes the number of elements in . At the end of each cycle, we have a new draw
t. We repeat this step N times to get a sample of N draws for .
4. It has been shown that samples drawn in this way converge to the distribution f(jY ) under
very general conditions (see, e.g., Geweke, 2005). We assess convergence and throw away an
appropriate burn-in sample.
In practice, we run four such \chains" starting two from one set of initial values and two from
another set of initial values. We choose starting values that are far apart in the following way: The
rst set of starting values has Ii;t = 0 for all i and all t and sets xi;t = ci;t and zi;t = 0 for all i and all
t. The second set of starting values is constructed as follows. Ii;t = 1 for all i and all t. We extract
a smooth trend (with breaks in 1946 and 1973) from ci;t. Denote this trend by ct
i;t and denote the
remaining variation in consumption as cc
i;t = ci;t   ct
i;t. We set zi;t = min(max( 0:5;cc
i;t);0) and
xi;t = ci;t   zi;t. The rst set of starting values thus attributes all the variation in the data to xi;t,
while the second attributes the bulk of the variation in the data around a smooth trend to zi;t.
Given a sample from the joint distribution f(jY ) of the unobserved variables conditional on
the observed data, we can calculate any statistic of interest that involves . For example, we can
46The Metropolis algorithm samples a proposal 
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i ). This proposal dis-













i . Using the Metropolis
algorithm to sample from f(ij i;Y ) is much less ecient than the standard algorithms used to sample from known
distributions such as the normal distribution in most software packages. Intuitively, this is because it is dicult to









Abel, A. B. (1999): \Risk Premia and Term Premia in General Equilibrium," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 43, 3{33.
Alvarez, F., and U. J. Jermann (2004): \Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business
Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, 112(6), 1223{1256.
Arakelian, V., and E. G. Tsionas (2009): \Bayesian Analysis of the Consumption CAPM," in
Bayesian Econometrics (Advances in Econometrics, Volume 23), ed. by T. B. Fomby, and R. C.
Hill, pp. 619{643, England. Emerald Group Publishing.
Backus, D. K., and G. W. Smith (1993): \Consumption and Real Exchange Rates in Dynamic
Economcies with Non-Traded Goods," Journal of International Economics, 35(3-4), 297{316.
Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon (1989): \The Estimation of Prewar Gross National Product:
Methodology and New Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 97, 38{92.
Bansal, R., and A. Yaron (2004): \Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset
Pricing Puzzles," Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1481{1509.
Barr, D., and J. Y. Campbell (1997): \Ination, Real Interest Rates, and the Bond Mar-
ket: A Study of UK Nominal and Index-Linked Goverment Bond Prices," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 39, 361{383.
Barro, R. (1997): Macroeconomics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
(2006): \Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 121(3), 832{866.
(2009): \Rare Disasters, Asset Prices, and Welfare Costs," American Economic Review,
99(1), 243{264.
Barro, R. J., and T. Jin (2011): \On the Size Distribution of Macroeconomic Disasters,"
Econometrica, forthcoming.
Barro, R. J., and J. F. Ursua (2008): \Macroeconomic Crises since 1870," Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 2008, 255{350.
(2009): \Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions," NBER Working Paper No. 14760.
Bates, D. (1996): \Jumps and Stochastic Volatility: Exchange Rat Processes Implicit in Deutsche
Mark Options," Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 69{107.
Beeler, J., and J. Y. Campbell (2009): \The Long-Run Risk Model and Aggregate Asset
Prices: An Empirical Assessment," NBER Working Paper No. 14788.
33Brunnermeier, M. K., S. Nagel, and L. H. Pedersen (2008): \Carry Trades and Currency
Crashes," in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, ed. by D. Acemoglu, K. Rogo, and M. Woodford,
pp. 313{347, Chicago, Il. University of Chicago Press.
Burnside, A., M. S. Eichenbaum, I. Kleshchelski, and S. Rebelo (2008): \Do Peso Prob-
lems Explain the Returns to the Carry Trade?," NBER Working Paper No. 14054.
Campbell, J. Y. (2003): \Consumption-Based Asset Pricing," in Handbook of the Economics of
Finance, ed. by G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz, pp. 804{887, Amsterdam. Elsevier.
Campbell, J. Y., and J. H. Cochrane (1999): \By force of habit: A consumption-based
explanation of aggregate stock market behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 107, 205{251.
Campbell, J. Y., R. Shiller, and L. Viceira (2009): \Understanding Ination-Indexed Bond
Markets," Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2009(1), 79{120.
Cerra, V., and S. C. Saxena (2008): \Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery,"
American Economic Review, 98(1), 439{457.
Cochrane, J. H. (1988): \How Big Is the Random Walk in GNP?," Journal of Political Economy,
96(5), 893{920.
Cogley, T. (1990): \International Evidence on the Size of the Random Walk in Output," Journal
of Political Economy, 98(3), 501{518.
Constantinides, G. (1982): \Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers and
without Demand Aggregation," Journal of Business, 55(2), 253{267.
(2008): \Consumption Crises since 1870," Brookings Conference Discussion of \Macroe-
conomic Crises since 1870" by Robert J. Barro and Jose F. Ursua.
Constantinides, G., and D. Duffie (1996): \Asset Pricing with heterogeneous consumers,"
Journal of Political Economy, 104(2), 219{240.
Davis, D. R., and D. E. Weinstein (2002): \Bones, Bombs and Break Points: The Geography
of Economic Activity," American Economic Review, 92(5), 1269{1289.
Dimson, E., P. Marsh, and M. Staunton (2002): Triumph of the Optimists. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Epstein, L. G., and S. E. Zin (1989): \Substitution, Risk Aversion and the Temporal Behavior
of Consumption and Asset Returns," Econometrica, 57, 937{969.
Eraker, B., M. Johannes, and N. Polson (2003): \The Impact of Jumps in Volatility and
Returns," Journal of Finance, 58, 1269{1300.
Evans, M. (1998): \Real Rates, Expected Ination, and Ination Risk Premia," Journal of Fi-
nance, 53(1), 187{218.
Farhi, E., S. P. Fraiberger, X. Gabaix, R. Ranciere, and A. Verdelhan (2009): \Crash
Risk in Currency Markets," Working Paper, Harvard University.
Farhi, E., and X. Gabaix (2008): \Rare Disasters and Exchange Rates," Working Paper.
Gabaix, X. (2008): \Variable Rare Disasters: A Tractable Theory of Ten Puzzles in Macro-
Finance," American Economic Review, 98(2), 64{67.
34Gelfand, A. (2000): \Gibbs Sampling," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 95(452),
1300{1304.
Gelman, A., J. B. Carlin, H. S. Stern, and D. B. Rubin (2004): Bayesian Data Analysis.
John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey.
Gelman, A., and D. B. Rubin (1992): \Inference from Iterative Simulation Using Multiple
Sequences," Statistical Science, 7, 457{511.
Geweke, J. (2005): Contemporary Bayesian Econometrics and Statistics. Chapman & Hall/CRC,
Boca Raton, Florida.
(2007): \Models, Computational Experiments and Reality," Working Paper, Iowa Uni-
versity.
Gourio, F. (2008): \Disasters and Recoveries," American Economic Review, 98(2), 68{73.
(2010): \Disaster Risk and Business Cycles," Working Paper, Boston University.
Gruber, J. (2006): \A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution,"
NBER Working Paper No. 11945.
Guo, K. (2007): \Exchange Rates and Asset Prices in an Open Economy with Rare Disasters,"
Working Paper, Harvard University.
Guvenen, F. (2008): \A Parsimonious Macroeconomic Model for Asset Pricing," Working Paper.
Hall, R. E. (1988): \Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," Journal of Political Economy,
96(2), 339{357.
Hansen, L. P., and K. J. Singleton (1982): \Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation
of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models," Econometrica, 50, 1269{1288.
Julliard, C., and A. Ghosh (2010): \Can Rare Events Explain the Equity Premium Puzzle?,"
Working Paper.
Jurek, J. W. (2008): \Crash-Neutral Currency Carry Trades," Working Paper, Princeton Uni-
versity.
Kilian, L., and L. E. Ohanian (2002): \Unit Roots, Trend Breaks, and Transitory Dynamics:
A Macroeconomic Perspective," Macroeconomic Dynamics, 6(5), 614{632.
Koop, G., and S. M. Potter (2007): \Estimation and Forecasting in Models with Multiple
Breaks," Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), 763{789.
Lettau, M., and J. A. Wachter (2007): \Why Is Long-Horizon Equity Less Risky? A Duration-
Based Explanation of the Value Premium," Journal of Finance, 62(1), 55{92.
Lucas, R. E. (1978): \Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, 46(6), 1429{1445.
Maddison, A. (2003): The World Economy: Historical Statistics. OECD, Paris.
Martin, I. (2008): \Disasters and the Welfare Cost of Uncertainty," American Economic Review,
98(2), 74{78.
Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott (1985): \The Equity Premium: A Puzzle," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 15, 145{161.
35Nakamura, E., D. Sergeyev, and J. Steinsson (2012): \Growth-Rate and Uncertainty Shocks
in Consumption: Cross-Country Evidence," Working Paper, Columbia University.
Perron, P. (1989): \The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis,"
Econometrica, 57, 1361{1401.
Pesaran, M. H., D. Pettenuzzo, and A. Timmermann (2006): \Forecasting Time Series
Subject to Multiple Structural Breaks," Review of Economic Studies, 73(4), 1057{1084.
Piazzesi, M. (2010): \Understanding Returns on Average and over Time," NBER Reporter 2010,
(2), Program Report for the NBER Asset Pricing Program.
Piazzesi, M., and M. Schneider (2006): \Equilibrium Yield Curves," in NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, ed. by D. Acemoglu, K. Rogo, and M. Woodford, pp. 389{442, Cambridge, Ma. MIT
Press.
Rietz, T. A. (1988): \The Equity Risk Premium: A Solution," Journal of Monetary Economics,
22, 117{131.
Romer, C. D. (1986): \Is the Stabilization of the Postwar Economy a Figment of the Data,"
American Economic Review, 76(3), 314{334.
Rubinstein, M. (1974): \An Aggregation Theorem for Securities Markets," Journal of Financial
Economics, 1, 225{244.
Smith, A., and A. Gelfand (1992): \Bayesian Statistics without Tears: A Sampling-Resampling
Perspective," The American Statistician, 46(2), 84{88.
Tsionas, E. G. (2005): \Likelihood Evidence on the Asset Returns Puzzle," Review of Economic
Studies, 72, 917{946.
van Binsbergen, J. H., M. W. Brandt, and R. S. Koijen (2010): \On the Timing and Pricing
of Dividends," Working Paper, Northwestern University.
van Binsbergen, J. H., W. Hueskes, R. S. Koijen, and E. Vrugt (2010): \Asset Pric-
ing Puzzles: Measuring the Importance of Short-Term and Long-Term Risk," Working Paper,
Northwestern University.
Wachter, J. A. (2008): \Can time-varying risk of rare disasters explain aggregate stock market
volatility," Working Paper.
Weil, P. (1990): \Nonexpected Utility in Macroeconomics," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
105(1), 29{42.
Wilson, R. B. (1968): \The Theory of Syndicates," Econometrica, 36, 119{132.
36Prior Dist. Prior Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Post SD.
pW Uniform 0.050 0.029 0.037 0.016
pCbW Uniform 0.500 0.289 0.623 0.076
pCbI Uniform 0.050 0.029 0.006 0.003
1-pCe Uniform 0.500 0.289 0.835 0.027
ρz Uniform 0.450 0.260 0.500 0.034
φ Uniform* -0.176 0.064 -0.111 0.008
θ Normal 0.000 0.200 -0.025 0.007
σφ Uniform* 0.098 0.047 0.083 0.006
σθ Uniform 0.130 0.069 0.121 0.015
TABLE I
Disaster Parameters
We specify uniform priors on φ* and σφ*, the mean and standard deviation of the underlying
normal distribution (before truncation). These priors imply (non-uniform) priors on φ and σφ. The
numbers in the table refer to the prior mean and standard deviation of φ and σφ.Country Start Date End Date Max Drop Perm Drop Perm/Max Country Start Date End Date Max Drop Perm Drop Perm/Max
Argentina 1890 1908 -0.23 0.02 -0.07 Japan 1940 1952 -0.61 -0.41 0.67
Argentina 1914 1917 -0.13 -0.05 0.37 South Korea 1940 1960 -0.58 -0.48 0.83
Argentina 1930 1933 -0.16 -0.10 0.65 South Korea 1997 2004 -0.23 -0.18 0.81
Argentina 2000 2004 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 Mexico 1914 1918 -0.16 0.27 -1.66
Australia 1914 1923 -0.29 -0.14 0.48 Mexico 1930 1935 -0.24 -0.06 0.23
Australia 1930 1934 -0.24 -0.16 0.65 Netherlands 1914 1919 -0.45 -0.07 0.15
Australia 1939 1956 -0.31 -0.09 0.27 Netherlands 1940 1952 -0.55 -0.10 0.18
Belgium 1913 1920 -0.40 0.05 -0.12 Norway 1914 1924 -0.13 -0.04 0.33
Belgium 1939 1950 -0.52 -0.14 0.26 Norway 1940 1944 -0.08 -0.07 0.84
Brazil 1930 1932 -0.12 -0.05 0.46 Peru 1930 1933 -0.17 -0.08 0.47
Brazil 1940 1942 -0.07 0.00 0.01 Peru 1977 1993 -0.40 -0.37 0.93
Canada 1914 1926 -0.37 -0.20 0.55 Portugal 1914 1921 -0.28 -0.16 0.56
Canada 1930 1933 -0.29 -0.28 0.94 Portugal 1940 1942 -0.09 -0.07 0.74
Chile 1914 1934 -0.53 -0.36 0.69 Spain 1914 1919 -0.10 0.00 0.02
Chile 1955 1958 -0.07 -0.02 0.34 Spain 1930 1961 -0.59 -0.54 0.91
Chile 1972 1987 -0.58 -0.56 0.95 Sweden 1914 1923 -0.21 -0.15 0.72
Denmark 1914 1926 01 6 00 8 05 4 Sweden 1940 1951 02 8 01 4 05 1
Disaster Episodes
TABLE II
Denmark 1914 1926 -0.16 -0.08 0.54 Sweden 1940 1951 -0.28 -0.14 0.51
Denmark 1940 1950 -0.28 -0.11 0.40 Switzerland 1914 1921 -0.14 -0.09 0.62
Finland 1890 1893 -0.08 -0.01 0.18 Switzerland 1940 1950 -0.23 -0.15 0.65
Finland 1914 1921 -0.42 -0.22 0.52 Taiwan 1901 1916 -0.24 -0.09 0.37
Finland 1930 1934 -0.23 -0.11 0.49 Taiwan 1940 1955 -0.65 -0.46 0.71
Finland 1940 1945 -0.29 -0.14 0.48 United Kingdom 1914 1921 -0.20 -0.10 0.50
France 1914 1921 -0.22 0.08 -0.36 United Kingdom 1940 1946 -0.20 -0.08 0.39
France 1940 1945 -0.56 -0.07 0.12 United States 1914 1922 -0.24 -0.14 0.57
Germany 1914 1932 -0.45 -0.22 0.48 United States 1930 1935 -0.26 -0.14 0.53
Germany 1940 1950 -0.48 -0.35 0.71
Italy 1940 1949 -0.33 -0.15 0.45 Average -0.29 -0.14 0.42
Japan 1914 1918 -0.04 0.12 -2.73 Median -0.24 -0.10 0.48
A disaster episode is defined as a set of consecudite years for a particular country such that: 1) The probability of a disaster in each of these years is larger than
10%, 2) The sum of the probability of disaster for each year over the whole set of years is larger than 1. Max Drop is the posterior mean of the maximum
shortfall in the level of consumption due to the disaster. Perm Drop is the posterior mean of the permanent effect of the disaster on the level potential
consumption. Perm/Max is the ratio of Perm Drop to Max Drop.Prior Dist. Prior Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Post SD. Post. Mean Post SD. Post. Mean Post SD.
Argentina Normal 0.02 1.00 0.015 0.010 0.018 0.011 0.008 0.011
Australia Normal 0.02 1.00 0.014 0.006 0.023 0.005 0.020 0.003
Belgium Normal 0.02 1.00 0.007 0.006 0.027 0.005 0.019 0.003
Brazil Normal 0.02 1.00 0.025 0.008 0.037 0.009 0.017 0.008
Canada Normal 0.02 1.00 0.027 0.005 0.025 0.005 0.018 0.004
Chile Normal 0.02 1.00 0.019 0.009 0.024 0.009 0.040 0.011
Denmark Normal 0.02 1.00 0.018 0.004 0.022 0.005 0.012 0.004
Finland Normal 0.02 1.00 0.025 0.006 0.043 0.007 0.024 0.006
France Normal 0.02 1.00 0.003 0.003 0.038 0.003 0.019 0.002
Germany Normal 0.02 1.00 0.014 0.004 0.051 0.005 0.018 0.003
Italy Normal 0.02 1.00 0.010 0.003 0.046 0.004 0.021 0.003
Japan Normal 0.02 1.00 0.005 0.004 0.075 0.005 0.022 0.004
Korea Normal 0.02 1.00 0.017 0.005 0.037 0.010 0.053 0.006
Mexico Normal 0.02 1.00 0.005 0.008 0.025 0.007 0.016 0.007
Netherlands Normal 0.02 1.00 0.011 0.004 0.035 0.007 0.016 0.004
Norway Normal 0.02 1.00 0.015 0.004 0.027 0.004 0.026 0.004
Peru Normal 0.02 1.00 0.020 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.013 0.008
Portugal Normal 0.02 1.00 0.017 0.008 0.042 0.007 0.030 0.006
Spain Normal 0.02 1.00 0.011 0.005 0.055 0.008 0.021 0.004
Sweden Normal 0.02 1.00 0.026 0.003 0.025 0.004 0.013 0.003
Switzerland Normal 0.02 1.00 0.013 0.003 0.027 0.003 0.009 0.002
Taiwan Normal 0.02 1.00 0.007 0.007 0.058 0.009 0.056 0.006
United Kingdom Normal 0.02 1.00 0.010 0.003 0.020 0.004 0.024 0.003
United States Normal 0.02 1.00 0.018 0.003 0.025 0.003 0.022 0.003
Median 0.015 0.005 0.029 0.005 0.019 0.004
Simple Average 0.015 0.005 0.035 0.006 0.022 0.005
Post-1973
Mean Growth Rate of Potential Consumption
TABLE III
Prior Pre-1946 1946-1972Dist. Prior Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Post SD. Post. Mean Post SD. Post. Mean Post SD.
Argentina Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.053 0.009 0.020 0.013 0.013 0.009
Australia Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.017 0.004 0.036 0.008 0.004 0.003
Belgium Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.020 0.002 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.002
Brazil Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.047 0.006 0.062 0.011 0.010 0.007
Canada Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.024 0.003 0.026 0.009 0.003 0.002
Chile Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.043 0.009 0.038 0.018 0.018 0.010
Denmark Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.021 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003
Finland Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.031 0.005 0.020 0.008 0.004 0.003
France Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.014 0.002 0.031 0.005 0.002 0.001
Germany Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.019 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.002
Italy Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.019 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.002
Japan Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.022 0.003 0.017 0.005 0.003 0.002
Korea Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.026 0.004 0.027 0.007 0.004 0.003
Mexico Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.036 0.004 0.034 0.008 0.005 0.004
Netherlands Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.023 0.003 0.017 0.006 0.003 0.002
Norway Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.022 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
Peru Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.033 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
Portugal Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.033 0.004 0.023 0.008 0.005 0.003
Spain Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.024 0.003 0.045 0.008 0.003 0.002
Sweden Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.019 0.002 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.002
Switzerland Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.012 0.001 0.039 0.005 0.002 0.001
Taiwan Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.033 0.004 0.018 0.016 0.004 0.003
United Kingdom Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
United States Uniform 0.075 0.04 0.018 0.002 0.021 0.004 0.003 0.002
Median 0.023 0.003 0.020 0.006 0.003 0.002
Simple Average 0.026 0.004 0.023 0.007 0.005 0.003
TABLE IV
Permanent
Temporary             
Pre-1946
Temporary             
Post-1946 Priors
Standard Deviation of Non-Disaster ShocksPrior Dist. Prior Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Post SD.
pW Uniform 0.050 0.029 0.035 0.017
pCbW Uniform 0.500 0.289 0.715 0.094
pCbI Uniform 0.050 0.029 0.008 0.004
1-pCe Uniform 0.500 0.289 0.847 0.029
ρz Uniform 0.450 0.260 0.541 0.037
φ Uniform 0.100 0.058 0.075 0.011
θ Normal 0.000 0.200 -0.020 0.006
σφ Uniform 0.130 0.069 0.091 0.008
σθ Uniform 0.130 0.069 0.110 0.012
TABLE V






No Disasters 0.005 0.042
Permanent, One Period Disasters 0.466 -0.378
Disasters and the Equity Premium
TABLE VI
All cases have CRRA = 6.4, IES = 2 and β = exp(-0.034). The return statistics are
the log of the average gross return for each asset. The "Equity Premium" is the
different between the average return on an unlevered equity claim and bills. The
"Risk-Free Rate" is the average return on bills. These results are produced by









1. Baseline 6.4 2 0.048 0.010 0.049 0.011
Permanence and Disaster Length:
2. Permanent 4.4 2 0.048 0.007 0.046 0.015
3. Permanent and One Period 3.0 2 0.048 0.000 0.057 -0.002
Disasters with No Short-Run Shocks
4. No Short-Run Shocks 6.4 2 0.030 0.025 0.028 0.028
Sensitivity to Gamma:
5. Low Gamma 4.4 2 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.033
6. High Gamma 8.4 2 0.083 -0.017 0.086 -0.019
Model with Gamma Shocks:
7. Gamma Shocks 6.4 2 0.032 0.022 0.032 0.025
Power Utility:
8. Power Utility 4.0 0.25 0.012 0.097 -0.011 0.099
9. Power Utility -- One Period/Perm 3.0 0.33 0.048 -0.001 0.060 -0.001
10. Power Utility -- One Period 2.3 0.43 0.048 0.033 0.060 0.009
In all cases, β = exp(-0.034). For case 1, the model of consumption dynamics is parameterized according to the
estimates presented in tables 1 through 4. Cases 2-6 and 8-10 are variations on this parameterization. Case 7 is
parameterized according to the estimates presented in tables 5 and corresponding estimates of the non-disaster
parameters (not-reported). The return statistics are the log of the average gross return for each asset. "Full Sample"
refers to a long sample with a representative set of disasters. "No Disaster" refers to a long sample in which agents
expect disasters to occur with their normal frequency but non actually occur. The "Equity Premium" is the different
between the average return on an unlevered equity claim and bills. The "Risk-Free Rate" is the average return on bills.
Asset Pricing Results for Unleveraged Equity
TABLE VII
CRRA IES
Full Sample No Disasters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameters:
Coefficient of relative risk aversion 6.4 6.4 7.5 7.5
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 2222
Probability of partial default on perpetuity 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.84
Probability of partial default on one period bond 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4
Asset Pricing Results:
Return on one period bond 0.010 0.024 0.014 0.014
Return on perpetuity -0.021 -0.005 -0.025 0.026
Term premium -0.032 -0.029 -0.039 0.012
Equity premium 0.048 0.033 0.048 0.048
Average duration of perpetuity in normal times 11.3 9.6 11.9 7.4
TABLE VIII
Long Term Bonds and Partial Default





















A Partially Permanent Disaster 
Note: The figure plots the evolution of consumption and potential consumption during and after a disaster lasting six 
periods with ρ = 0.6,  = -0.125 and  = -0.025 in each period of the disaster. For simplicity, we abstract from trend 
































A Typical Disaster 
Note: The figure plots the evolution of log consumption during and after a disaster that strikes in period 1 and lasts 
for 6 years. Over the course of the disaster, both  and  take values equal to their posterior means in each period. 




































Ex Ante Disaster Distribution 
Note: The solid line is the mean of the distribution of the change in log consumption relative to its previous trend 
from the perspective of agents that have just learned that they have entered the disaster state but do not yet know the 
size or length of the disaster. The black dashed line is the median of this distribution. The grey dashed lines are the 




































World Disaster Probability 
Note: The figure plots the posterior mean of IW,t, i.e., the probability that the world entered a disaster in each year evaluated using data 






















Median Path of Consumption after Onset of a Disaster in Model and Data 
Note: The figure plots the median path of consumption after the onset of a disaster in the model and in the data. For the model, the 
25% and 75% quantiles are also plotted (broken lines). For the data, we consider the 49 disaster episodes that are not left censored 
(i.e., don’t begin in the first period we observe for that country). For each episode, we calculate the change in consumption relative to 
the year before the disaster began. We then take the median across episodes for each year. For the model, we simulate 1000 disaster 
episodes and calculate the median change in consumption relative to the year before the disaster began as well as the 25
th and 75
th 






















Asset Prices in Baseline Case with Epstein-Zin-Weil Utility 
Note: The figure plots asset returns and detrended log consumption for a “typical” disaster in the baseline case of multi-
period disasters with partial recovery when agents have Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences with a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion of 6.4 and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 2. The typical disaster is a disaster that lasts 6 periods and 
in which the short run and long run disaster shocks take their mean values in each period of the disaster. All other shocks 














































































































Asset Prices in Baseline Case with Power Utility 
Note: The figure plots asset returns and detrended log consumption for a “typical” disaster in the baseline case of multi-
period disasters with partial recovery when agents have power utility with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4. The 
typical disaster is a disaster that lasts five periods and in which the short run and long run disaster shocks take their mean 






































Asset Prices in Permanent, One Period Case with Power Utility 
Note: The figure plots asset returns and detrended log consumption for a “typical” disaster in the case of fully permanent, 
one-period disasters when agents have power utility with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3. The typical disaster is 
a disaster that lasts one period and in which the short run and long run disaster shocks are equal to -0.40. All other shocks 
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